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The ‘death’ of Economics?
 Popular Belief: conventional economics has ‘failed’!
- failed to predict the GFC
- failed to prevent the GFC
- caused the GFC.
The critics 
 “Last year, everything [in economics] came apart.”
Paul Krugman (Nobel prize-winning economist,
journalist)
 “Economics is extremely unhealthy at all levels, from 
introductory pedagogy to high research.  As the global 
economy enters what could well be the Second Great 
Depression, economic theory is as useless a guide to how the 
economy actually functions as it was in the late 1920s.”
Steve Keen (Australian economist)
Two particular culprits
 But the favourite whipping boys resided in financial 
economics:
- efficient markets hypothesis (EMH)
- extensive use of mathematics in finance (both practitioners 
and academics)  
The EMH is dead, buried, and 
unlamented … isn’t it?
 To put it bluntly, [the] efficient market hypothesis does not work. It
never has. Markets are not self-correcting.
Louis Uchitelle (journalist)
 “The demise of Lehman Brothers conclusively falsifies the efficient 
market hypothesis.”
George Soros (Fund manager and speculator)
 [The GFC] proves the myth of efficient markets.
Nick Smith (journalist)
Not to mention deeply disliked…
 The upside of the [GFC] is that it could drive a stake through the 
heart of the academic nostrum known as the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
Roger Lowenstein (author, journalist)
 The incredibly inaccurate efficient market theory [caused] a lethally 
dangerous combination of asset bubbles, lax controls, pernicious 
incentives and wickedly complicated instruments [that] led to our 
current plight. 
Jeremy Grantham (financial analyst, fund manager) 
EMH: ‘Security prices reflect all 
available information’
Implications:
NO: All investors are rational.
NO: Market prices will be predictable and stable.
NO: Market prices are always right.
YES: No investor has an information advantage.
YES: Market prices will be unpredictable and volatile.
YES: It’s impossible to tell whether market prices are right or wrong.
YES: It’s impossible to consistently beat the market, net of the costs of 
acquiring information.
But many try…
35 Fund Classes: End-year 2008 (S&P)
1 year 3 year 5 year
Funds - Index (pp) -4.1 -1.9 -1.5
%(Funds - Index) < 0 89 91 94
“The belief that bear markets favor active management is a myth.”
The GFC proves the EMH is rubbish. 
Or does it…?
 Collapse of large and venerable institutions couldn’t happen in an 
‘efficient market’ (Soros)
- Confuses efficiency with stability
 Financial economists didn’t predict the GFC
- Confuses efficiency with predictability
- Financial markets did predict trouble
 The collapse all happened at once
- Confuses efficiency with stability
 The obvious asset price bubble couldn’t happen in an ‘efficient market’
- Confuses efficiency with predictability
Now this is a Bubble!
57 people were killed, but no reports on the ‘death of volcanology’ 
Did the EMH cause the GFC?
 Belief in the EMH by traders and regulators caused the GFC to happen
- ‘price is right’ argument
- blaming instrument for the sins of musician
 But is the EMH too easily misinterpreted?
 Practitioners have never believed in the EMH - ‘easy to beat the 
market’. 
 And regulators didn’t behave as though they believed in the EMH -
quite the opposite.
 If anything, it was a failure to believe in the EMH that 
contributed to the GFC!
Mathematics is the curse of 
economics … isn’t it?
 “Economists as a group mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking 
mathematics, for truth.”
Paul Krugman
 “In their desire for mathematical order and elegant models, the economic 
establishment played down the role of bad behaviour.”
Jeremy Grantham
 “It should be obvious to anyone with common sense that every financial 
[mathematics] axiom is wrong, and that finance can never in its wildest dreams 
be Euclid.”
Paul Wilmott (financial consultant)
 “One result of the collapse [is that] Li’s Gaussian copula formula [used to price 
CDOs] will go down in history as instrumental in causing the unfathomable 
losses that brought the world financial system to its knees.” 
Felix Salmon (journalist)
The  use of maths in finance is 
useless - ‘physics envy’
What happens when it breaks 
down?
 Government enquiries and public hearings?
 Drafting of new legislation and regulation over the management, 
staffing and organisation of particle accelerators, primarily by non-
physicists?
 Compensation limits imposed on senior Hadron physicists?
 ‘The death of physics’?
Yet the Large Hadron Collider is a simpler system than the financial 
system.
A curse – or a blessing?
 Worlds of business and finance inherently numerical
- proceeding without maths is like driving in the dark with your lights off
 What’s the alternative - purely literary exposition?  
- fine for the big picture, but hopeless for detail of complex systems 
- maths makes clear exactly what’s being assumed and that any conclusions follow
logically from those assumptions 
- no such discipline imposed by prose
 Mathematical models are approximations, but surely better to be 
partly right than totally wrong.
But did an over-reliance on maths 
in financial markets cause the GFC 
by over-simplifying the real world?
Individuals
 More mathematically illiterate much more likely to default on sub-prime 
mortgage. (Fed Reserve - Atlanta).
Institutions
 “Another [reason bankers weren’t aware of their risks] was that the quants, who 
should have been more aware of the copula’s weaknesses, weren’t the ones 
making the big asset-allocation decisions. Their managers, who made the actual 
calls, lacked the math skills to understand what the models were doing or how 
they worked. They could, however, understand something as simple as a single 
correlation number. That was the problem.”
Felix Salmon
Regulators
 Madoff’s returns mathematically impossible.
The problem was not too much maths in finance, but too much 
ignorance of maths by financial decision-makers!
Where does all this leave us?
 Do financial markets process info so well that the EMH is literally true?
- GFC suggests probably not
- but we knew that already!
 Do financial markets process info sufficiently well to preclude out-performance 
of the market?
- GFC confirms that they do
 Can one place total reliance on mathematical models in financial markets?
- GFC suggests probably not
- but we knew that already!
 Should financial decisions ignore mathematical methods?
- GFC confirms that this would be a ‘bad thing’.
GFC not a new and puzzling data point
The bottom line
Two Lessons
 The case for Market Efficiency survives the GFC.
 Regulators, investors and finance professionals need to have a greater 
belief in EMH, not less!
 The case for a mathematics-based approach to finance survives the 
GFC.
 Individuals, firms and regulators need to make greater use of maths 
for financial decision-making, not less!  
But doesn’t smoke indicate fire? 
Why is the EMH so reviled?
Whose ox is being gored here?
 Politicians
- preferable to blaming policies or people
 Practitioners
- ‘raison d’etre’ is beating the market
 Journalists
- inherent suspicion of markets
But there’s an even more 
fundamental reason
 Cognitive illusion.
“I used to work in financial betting (literally). Most of our business was premised on
people not being able to predict future markets, and I made a lot of money from that
turning out to be true. But I don’t believe in EMH, particularly after the dotcom
crash.”
Unknown contributor to online blog discussion
 Hard-wired belief: people who are smarter, more knowledgeable, and 
who work harder, should ‘win’. 
 But in financial markets, EMH says this isn’t true.
